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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 09-3710 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JASON SCALISE, 
 
    Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 07-cr-00052) 
District Judge:  Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr. 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 19, 2010 
 
Before:  HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR. and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  October 27, 2010) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Jason Scalise appeals the District Court’s judgment of sentence following his 
guilty pleas to two counts: (1) receipt of child pornography; and (2) possession of child 
pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)-(b).  We will affirm. 
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I. 
 Because we write for the parties, we recount only the essential facts and procedural 
history. 
On October 18, 2007, the Federal Bureau of Investigation searched Scalise’s 
residence after a computer technician reported that he had found files containing child 
pornography on the hard drive of Scalise’s computer.  The FBI discovered 33 movie clips 
 and another 43 disks containing approximately 200 movies and 500 still images of child 
pornography. 
After admitting to downloading and sharing child pornography on Limewire two 
to three times per week, Scalise pleaded guilty to: Receipt and Attempted Receipt of 
Material Depicting the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(a)(2) and § 2252(b)(1), and Possession and Attempted Possession of Material 
Depicting the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) 
and § 2252(b)(2). 
 The District Court determined that Scalise’s base offense level was 22, and his 
criminal history category was I.  Scalise received a three-level reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility, and a total of 18 levels of enhancements pursuant to § 2G2.2 of the 
Guidelines—for distribution in exchange for a thing of value (5 levels), material 
involving prepubescent minors (2 levels), images containing sadistic or violent acts (4 
levels), use of a computer (2 levels), and possession of more than 600 images (5 levels).  
Thus, Scalise’s total offense level reached 37, resulting in a Guidelines imprisonment 
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range of 210 to 262 months.  Because Scalise’s statutory range was 60-240 months, his 
final Guidelines range was 210-240 months. 
 Although Scalise conceded that his Guidelines range was calculated properly, he 
argued in his written position with respect to sentencing factors that his Guidelines range 
“is so far beyond the circumstances of his case as to be unjustified and unwarranted.”  
Scalise also contended that “there appears to be no rhyme, reason or justification for an 
almost arbitrary increase from a base offense level of 22 and a sentence of 41 to 51 
months to offense level 37 or 210 to 262 months.” 
 The District Court sentenced Scalise to 168 months in prison on Count One and 
120 months on Count Two, to be served concurrently, followed by ten years of supervised 
release, which included the following special condition: 
The defendant shall not associate with children under the age of 18, 
except in the presence of a responsible adult who is aware of the 
nature of the defendant’s background and current offense and who 
had been approved by the probation officer. 
 
 The District Court varied downward from the Guidelines range, finding that USSG 
§ 2G2.2 “diverges significantly from the Sentencing Commission’s typical empirical 
approach and produces a sentence greater than necessary to provide punishment.”  App. 
78-79 (quoting United States v. Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1008 (E.D. Wis. 2008)).  
Considering Scalise’s lack of a criminal history, his supportive family structure, his 
demonstration of remorse for the crimes he committed, and his decision to seek out 
psychological sex offender treatment, the District Court reasoned that a sentence of 210 
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months in prison “would be over the top.”  The Court then concluded that a sentence of 
168 months “adequately addresses the nature and the circumstances of this offense, as 
well as the history and background of the Defendant.” 
II. 
 Scalise timely appealed, claiming the District Court committed procedural error 
by: (1) relying on allegedly inaccurate and disparaging statements made by the FBI agent 
and prosecutor at sentencing; (2) failing to rule on his motion to depart from the 
Guidelines based on a psychological finding that he “does not meet the criteria of 
pedophilia”; and (3) failing to meaningfully address his non-frivolous arguments 
challenging the validity of § 2G2.2’s enhancements for specific offense characteristics.  
Scalise also claims his sentence was substantively unreasonable because it was “greater 
than necessary . . . to comply with the purposes of sentencing.” 
A.  
 We review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of Scalise’s sentence 
under an abuse of discretion standard.  United States v. Booker,,543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005); 
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 577 n.16 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 Conceding that the District Court accurately calculated his Guidelines range as 
required by the first step of United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006), 
Scalise claims the District Court failed at step two when it ignored his counsel’s “request” 
for a downward departure based on his psychologist’s finding that he “does not meet the 
DSM-IV criteria for Pedophilia.”  But the record reflects no such formal request for 
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departure.1  Even had such a request been made, § 5K2.0 greatly limits the grounds for 
departure and the fact that a defendant does not exhibit pedophilic tendencies is not one 
of them. 
 Scalise also claims the District Court erred at step three of Gunter.  He cites as 
procedural error the District Court’s consideration of improper testimony and its failure to 
address his arguments regarding the flawed nature of § 2G2.2.  Specifically, Scalise 
contends the District Court should not have considered the FBI agent’s statement that, 
given the number of images in Scalise’s collection, it was apparent that he had been 
trading for a “fairly lengthy course of time.”  In addition, Scalise argues that the Court 
should not have taken into account the prosecutor’s assertions that Scalise’s collection of 
adult female underwear was “extremely bizarre” and “an indicator of some deviate sexual 
activity.”  This argument is a non-starter because there is nothing inaccurate about these 
statements: nine months can properly be characterized as a “lengthy period of time,” and 
the “bizarreness” of Scalise’s behavior is a matter of opinion.  Moreover, nothing in the 
record suggests that the District Court relied on these statements in determining the 
seriousness of Scalise’s offense. 
 Nor are we persuaded by Scalise’s argument that the District Court failed to 
 
1 We agree with the Government that the statement made by Scalise’s attorney that 
a psychological report should “in the appropriate circumstances to be determined by the 
Court, allow for a free fall, what it used to be called, now a departure [sic],” did not 
amount to a formal departure request.  Thus, Scalise’s reliance on United States v. Lofink 
is misplaced.  See 564 F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 2009) (where the defendant formally moved 
for a downward departure under § 5K2.13 of the Guidelines). 
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adequately address his brief comments at sentencing regarding the validity of the 
individual enhancements applicable to his case.  A sentencing court must give 
“meaningful consideration to all the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),” United 
States v. Olhovsky, 562 F.3d 530, 546 (3d Cir. 2009), and “the record must show a true, 
considered exercise of discretion on the part of a district court, including a recognition of, 
and response to, the parties’ non-frivolous arguments,” United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 
834, 841 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 Although Scalise states in his Reply Brief that his counsel discussed “at length” 
the five individual sentencing enhancements applied to his case, we find only brief and 
undeveloped references to a lack of empirical data supporting these “artificial increases.” 
 Scalise’s counsel made no attempt at sentencing to substantiate his claims, instead 
arguing: “I don’t know [w]hat the empirical data or the scientific data or the 
psychological data is—I don’t think there is any.” 
 Given the lack of a factual record upon which to base its analysis, the District 
Court’s decision not to address each applicable enhancement individually was not 
procedural error.  See United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 329 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Moreover, while the District Court did not address each enhancement individually, it 
agreed with Scalise that § 2G2.2 was not grounded in the Commission’s “typical 
empirical approach.”  See App. 78-79 (quoting Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 1008).  For 
that reason, the District Court varied downward. 
 Thus, Scalise’s real argument is that the District Court’s analysis of the § 3553(a) 
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factors yielded a higher sentence than Scalise desired.  “The decision by the Court, 
however, not to give . . . mitigating factors the weight that [Scalise] contends they deserve 
does not render [his] sentence unreasonable.”  United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 
204 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 546 (3d Cir. 2007)).  
Because the Court adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors at step three, Scalise’s 
term of incarceration was not imposed in a procedurally unreasonable way.  
B. 
 Scalise also claims that his 168-month prison sentence, which “is closer to the 
statutory maximum of 20 years than the mandatory minimum of five years” is 
substantively unreasonable.  We must affirm “unless no reasonable sentencing court 
would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the 
district court provided.”  Tomko,,562 F.3d at 568. 
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that there was nothing substantively 
unreasonable about the District Court’s imposition of a 168-month prison sentence.  
Indeed, “the sentence as a whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the 
factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  Id. (quoting United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 
556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc)).  The fact that Scalise’s sentence is more than forty 
months below the low end of the Guidelines range influences our decision as well. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the District Court did not err with respect 
to Scalise’s 168-month prison sentence. 
III. 
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 Scalise also challenges the special condition of supervised release which restricts 
his interaction with minors.  Because Scalise did not object to the District Court’s 
imposition of this special condition at the sentencing hearing, we review it for plain 
error.2  United States v. Russell, 564 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 Although sentencing judges have “wide discretion in imposing supervised 
release,” United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 855 (1999), any special conditions must be “reasonably related” to the goals of 
deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation of the defendant, and must 
“involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary” to meet these 
goals.  18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1),(2).  If a condition infringes on a fundamental 
constitutional right, we will affirm only if the condition is “narrowly tailored and . . . 
directly related to deterring [the offender] and protecting the public.”  Crandon, 173 F.3d 
at 128. 
A. 
 
 2 We use a four-prong analysis to determine whether the district court committed  
plain error.  An appellant must show: (1) an error was committed; (2) the error was plain; 
(3) the error affected the defendant's substantial rights; and (4) the error “seriously affects 
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  United States v. 
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993).  “A plainly erroneous condition of supervised release 
will inevitably affect substantial rights, as a defendant who fails to meet that condition 
will be subject to further incarceration.”  United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 251 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  Moreover, imposing a sentence not authorized by law “seriously affects the 
fairness, integrity, and reputation of the proceedings.”  Id.  Thus, if we find that the 
District Court plainly erred in imposing this supervised release condition, we must vacate 
the condition. 
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 Scalise contends that the District Court may not impose a supervised release 
condition limiting his contact with minors without first making a factual finding that he 
will pose an actual danger to minors upon his release. 
 Although “courts of appeals have consistently required district courts to set forth 
factual findings to justify special probation conditions,” United States v. Warren, 186 
F.3d 358, 366 (3d Cir. 1999), “[w]here a sentencing court fails to adequately explain its 
reasons for imposing a condition of supervised release or the condition’s relationship to 
the applicable sentencing factors, we may nevertheless affirm the condition if we can 
‘ascertain any viable basis for the . . . restriction in the record before the District Court . . . 
on our own.’”  United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Warren, 186 F.3d at 367). 
 Here, the District Court failed to explain its reasons for imposing the special 
condition limiting Scalise’s contact with minors.  Nevertheless, we find adequate support 
for the imposition of this condition in the record.  Scalise was convicted of receipt and 
possession of child pornography.  Among the 700 or so images in his collection were a 
number of depictions of severe child abuse.  These facts alone provide a reasoned and 
adequate basis for the imposition of this condition.  See United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 
251, 269 (3d Cir. 2001). 
B. 
 Scalise also claims that the condition restricting his contact with all minors upon 
his release could be read to limit interaction with his future (as yet unborn) children.  He 
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argues that such an overbroad and vague condition might deter him from exercising his 
constitutional right to procreation, see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), 
and, should he have children, violate his fundamental right to familial integrity, see 
Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 303 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 Recognizing the “severe intrusion” which could result from such an expansive 
reading of this condition, we held in Loy that “absent a clearer sign from the District 
Court, the condition should be construed to apply only to other people’s children.”3  237 
F.3d at 251, 270.  Unlike in Voelker, where we found that the record supported a 
construction of the condition restricting Voelker’s interactions with his own children, 
here, nothing in the record supports such a finding.  489 F.3d at 154 (where the defendant 
“jeopardized his minor daughter’s welfare by offering her for sex during an online 
communication”).  Indeed, as the Government concedes, the restriction here must be 
interpreted to extend only to minors other than Scalise’s children.  See also United States 
v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 190-91 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that a condition limiting Miller’s 
contacts with “children under the age of 18 except for family members or children in the 
presence of an adult who has been approved by the probation officer . . . appears to 
accord with our precedent, address Miller’s overbreadth concerns, and satisfy the 
Government.”). 
 
 3 Although we held in Loy that we will construe “no minors” conditions narrowly 
to avoid any constitutional difficulty, we encourage sentencing courts to state specifically 
whether such a condition will apply to a defendant’s children or other members of his 
family. 
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C. 
 Finally, Scalise argues the District Court improperly delegated judicial authority to 
the probation officer by limiting his contact with minors except under the supervision of 
persons approved in advance by the probation officer. 
 “Probation officers have broad statutory authority to advise and supervise 
probationers, and to ‘perform any other duty that the court may designate.’”  United 
States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 250 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3603(10)).  
However, because probation officers are nonjudicial officers, they may not “decide the 
nature or extent of the punishment imposed upon a probationer.”  Id.  In balancing the 
“need for flexibility with the constitutional requirement that judges, not probation 
officers, set the terms of a sentence,” we distinguish between judicial and administrative 
authority as follows: 
If [the defendant] is required to participate in a mental health intervention 
only if directed to do so by his probation officer, then this special condition 
constitutes an impermissible delegation of judicial authority to the 
probation officer.  On the other hand, if the District Court was intending 
nothing more than to delegate to the probation officer the details with 
respect to the selection and schedule of the program, such delegation was 
proper. 
 
Id. (quoting United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 In United States v. Heckman, 592 F.3d 400 (3d Cir. 2010), we vacated a condition 
of supervised release which required the defendant to “follow the directions of the United 
States Probation Office regarding any contact with children of either sex under the age of 
18.”  Id. at 411.  Finding that this condition delegated complete discretion over 
12 
 
                                                
Heckman’s contact with minors to the Probation Office, we held that the sentencing court 
impermissibly abdicated its responsibility to set the conditions of his release.  Unlike the 
judicial power which was delegated in Heckman, the power to select a responsible 
individual to facilitate and supervise a defendant’s interactions with minors is 
administrative, more akin to selecting a defendant’s mental health program than directing 
participation in one. 
 We recognize, however, that in Voelker, we vacated as an “unbridled delegation of 
authority” a condition similar to the one at issue here.  489 F.3d at 154.  Animating our 
decision in Voelker, however, was a concern that Voelker’s probation officer would hold 
the “sole authority for deciding if [he] will ever have unsupervised contact with any 
minor, including his own children, for the rest of his life.”  Id.  Whereas Voelker’s 
condition threatened his lifelong relationship with his children, Scalise’s condition has a 
more limited reach.  The Government here concedes that Scalise’s condition will lift 
within ten years of his release and will have no effect on his interactions with his own 
children.  See 489 F.3d at 154.  Thus, Scalise’s liberty interest in associating freely with 
minors will not be unduly burdened by the condition.4 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
 4 We remain cognizant, however, of Voelker’s underlying concerns regarding the 
potential for probation officers to abuse their discretion.  Indeed, we see little practical 
difference between a probation officer who flatly prohibits any contact with minors and 
one who refuses to authorize a “responsible” adult to supervise interactions.  However, if 
upon his release, Scalise confronts this type of abuse, he remains able to petition the 
District Court to amend his conditions of supervised release. 
